Nuclear Deterrence: The Must-Win Argument for January/February

There are certain debate resolutions where most rounds over the topic boil down to whether or not one side is able to adequately prove that something is capable of working. For example, for last year’s nationals topic (Resolved: Violent revolution is a just response to political oppression), most debates boiled down to whether or not the negative was able to prove that non-violence was capable of addressing political oppression. Any debater on the negative who was unable to win the clash over non-violence, and thus unable to prove that non-violence was capable of doing this, had a very difficult time winning the round, as they offered no way out of oppressive governance. This is what I like to call a must-win argument. It is the argument on which entire rounds hinge, the argument which decides whether or not you are going to see a W or a L when you log into Tabroom. For that particular topic, the must-win argument was non-violence. For the January/February resolution (Resolved: The possession of nuclear weapons is immoral), I have a feeling that the must-win argument is going to be nuclear deterrence. 

Nuclear deterrence is a fairly simple concept to grasp. Large, nuclear-possessing states are disincentivized from engaging in conflict with one another because they want to avoid the risk of nuclear war at all costs. The basic thesis of nuclear deterrence is that increasing the costs of conflict decreases the probability of war because it makes the set of mutually preferable alternatives larger. This eloquently articulates a pretty intuitive concept: when the stakes of a war are raised, people will avoid that war at all costs. The argument is then that the possession of nuclear weapons has prevented and will continue to prevent great power conflict through this effect. The impact is that the world would be more dangerous without nuclear weapons, as major powers would face fewer inhibitions against armed conflict, and great power wars would become more likely. Whether articulated in this exact way or not, this idea of nuclear weapons ushering in an era of peace and preventing world wars is likely to be the main negative argument in most traditional rounds on this topic. It has a logical foundation and a decent amount of evidence to back it up – such as the fact that prior to the creation of nuclear weapons, the world saw 100 million deaths from conflict, whereas since their creation, there have only been 10 million. Statistics like this are likely to appeal to any judge. If the negative is able to prove this idea of nuclear deterrence, it’s a very strong argument with solid impacts. However, proving it is harder than it may seem. 

There are many ways to respond to nuclear deterrence on the affirmative, which is good, since it’s likely to be the sole argument of many negative cases on this topic. David Krieger in 2011 poked a lot of holes in nuclear deterrence theory, many of which can be easily applied in round. Among some of the most-effective responses are… 

• There is no causal relationship between the possession of nuclear weapons and a lack of conflict. Just because an attack has not occurred does not mean that it was prevented because of nukes. There is no way to prove the causal relationship that the negative assumes. 

• Nuclear deterrence relies on the rationality of leaders. The decision to deploy a nuclear weapon is extremely concentrated, often in the hands of a single person. This puts too much trust in one individual, and we do not know if a common rationality will hold among leaders, especially under immense stress. 

• War hasn’t gone away because of nuclear weapons. Instead, it’s just fractured into a hundred smaller proxy conflicts. However, proxy conflicts may be even worse than full-scale world wars. Unlike world wars, which typically only lasted a few years and ushered in an era of peace once they were over, proxy wars permanently wreck entire countries, exploiting them and leaving them in a state of instability so that larger countries don’t have to get their hands dirty. 

Even when considering these responses, nuclear deterrence is still a smart hill for the negative to die on. Increasing the cost of war doesn’t just decrease the probability of war. It also lights a fire under nations to cooperate with one another, as cooperation becomes imperative for survival. This serves as the foundation to the global cooperative system necessary to prevent and protect against countless existential risks. At the same time, the heightened risk of great power war that would abound without nuclear weapons would disrupt these systems and accelerate existential risks. 

There is bound to be a lot of clash over nuclear deterrence in the coming months. Both sides have logically-sound positions on the subject, meaning articulation and proper explanation will be key to most debates on this topic. The most important job for most negative cases is likely going to be proving that nuclear deterrence is a legitimate, tested, and proven theory. Nuclear deterrence is not just a must-win argument. It is the must-win argument for January/February. If any negative wants to win, they are likely going to have to sell the idea of nuclear deterrence, and unless any affirmative wants to let the prevention of tens of millions of deaths flow through, they are going to want to make sure they neutralize the nuclear deterrence argument before the 2NR.  

Read more here: 

• Dr. Bezya Unal, Chatham House

• Zachary Kallenborn, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

• Constance Baroudos, Lexington Institute

• Sinan Ülgen, Carnegie Endowment

• William Spaniel, Rush Rhees Library

• David Krieger, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation