Generating Gridlock: the Policy Paralysis of Breturn

October 7th, 2025
Audrey Han

In the status quo, in order for any country to apply to be a part of the European Union, they must apply under Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union. The United Kingdom is no exception despite its former member status. Even if fiat of the resolution guarantees UK membership in the European Union, it does not guarantee UK access to the rebates and opt-outs they’ve had before; in fact, as a new member state, the UK would have no such privileges, needing the approval of all 27 current member states in order to regain them. It becomes severely difficult to argue the idyllic situation that the UK would be granted the same opt-outs as before, as in some of the biggest countries in the EU—France, Germany, Italy, and Spain—the majority of their population only support the rejoining of Britain without the same opt-outs they possessed before.

To begin, the negative impacts of this dissonance between UK and EU policy can be analyzed through the lens of just the UK economy itself. In fact, one of the most profound reasons keeping the UK from rejoining the EU would be the loss of the Euro opt-out. The Euro opt-out was adopted in 1992, allowing the UK to keep their own currency, the Sterling Pound, rather than entering the Eurozone. However, renewed EU membership would mean they would now be required to enter the Eurozone, causing a significant loss in monetary independence. EU member countries have interest rates controlled by the European Central Bank; while this system may promote a consistent and streamlined economic policy to unify all EU nations, the flaws become exacerbated during times of economic crisis. For example, in the European Crisis of 2012, the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis, countries like Greece suffered unemployment rates of over 25% and a record-deep recession, all because they had considerably higher inflation rates compared to countries like Germany, yet they could not devalue, cut interest rates, or print more money. Along with countries like Spain and Portugal, their goods ended up becoming increasingly uncompetitive, leading to record current account deficits.

Additionally, the UK would be forced to meet a euro convergence criteria, which are tests on price stability, sustainable fiscal position, exchange rate stability, and long term interest rates. Yet, in order to successfully adjust their economy to meet these standards, the UK must maintain a debt to GDP ratio below 60%; currently, the UK national debt makes up for 95.8% of government spending. The British government would have to significantly restrain their fiscal policy in order to meet this goal, which is a very dramatic and difficult change to adapt to as it can lead to deeper recessions and loss of government control over spending.

Nonetheless, the most monumental impact of the differing policies between the EU and the United Kingdom would be the grid-lock that results in the European Union, which has the potential to effectively stall critical decision making. Pre-Brexit, the UK possessed the most opt-outs and rebates out of any of the European Union countries, marking it as the least integrated country in the organization. Not including the Euro opt-out, there’s been 4 other instances of active divergence and 15 cases of passive divergence between EU and UK policies. Some of the major ones with a history of disagreement and clash include the Schengen system, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the area of freedom, security and justice.

This issue of divergence becomes even more urgent given the fact that the European Union is lacking serious reform when it comes to the process of admitting new member states. Allotting the UK as a member would only increase the internal tension of the EU, as the process it takes for EU and UK both to adjust to a new strict blueprint of policies would be both long and costly, leading to immense policy paralysis. Currently, according to MEP Sandro Gozi, without undergoing internal reform, an enlarged EU has the “risk of paralysis” and that it is “practically unthinkable” for the EU to embrace “a greater burden in terms of countries, financial commitments, and obligations” without fixing internal strife first. Gozi’s worries are not unfounded—historically, enlargements have been found to increase the cost of organizing decisions, causing high transaction costs that slow down EU law making. Using evidence from enlargements up through 2006 like the 2004 “Big Bang” that added 10 countries to the EU, it becomes clear that enlargement leads to a weakening internal structure due to a multitude of differences in coordination, bargaining, and veto-players.

It is key, now more than ever, that the EU continue passing policies and laws without internal strife. Since President Trump backed out of the Paris Agreement, the EU has not only remained loyal, but has now become a leader in passing climate change policies. The policies the EU has passed have a positive effect internationally, inspiring and pushing other global superpowers and countries alike to follow in their footsteps and take action.

The affirmation’s arguments such as economic reform, or any kind of political reform or improvement all rely on the passing of policies that change the status quo. However, given the immense gridlock and dissonance in policies, it would take months, if not years to occur, meaning that this argument effectively pre-reqs their impacts, as well as outweighing them on timeframe.

The return of Britain to the EU has a uniquely detrimental effect on policy paralysis, and the EU and the world alike cannot afford a pause or slow-down on climate change.