Cambodia and Thailand Strike Again

After a ceasefire was brokered just a few months ago and the premiership controversy of Paetongtarn Shinawatra was settled, it seemed unlikely that Cambodia and Thailand would fight again in the short term. Yet just a few days ago, fighting flared up again, with Thailand launching air strikes against Cambodia. Let’s go through some context and the implications of this.

In late June, already bad relations turned sour between the two countries. Back then, Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra was found to be in a phone call with former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. In the call, she repeatedly spoke fondly of Sen, called him “uncle”, and expressed concern about the actions the Thai military was taking in the fighting. Thai people were outraged due to the phone call, and eventually, Shinawatra was removed from office by the Constitutional Court in August.

These sour relations contributed to further fighting. In late July, fighting flared along sections of the Cambodian‑Thai border after a Thai soldier was killed in a clash that Bangkok blamed on Cambodian forces and on newly laid landmines in the border region. In five days of intense exchanges, including artillery and rocket fire, at least several dozen people were killed and more than 300,000 civilians displaced, with both governments accusing the other of targeting civilian areas.​

The situation, rooted in long‑running disputes over border demarcation near heavily militarized, resource‑rich zones, quickly became a test of domestic resolve for Thailand’s fragile coalition government and for Cambodia’s leadership, which framed Thai actions as major aggression. 

A first major inflection point for the war came with the July ceasefire, made under Malaysian mediation and with envoys from the United States and China at the table. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim announced that Cambodia and Thailand had agreed to halt hostilities at midnight local time, commit to renewed dialogue, and work toward mechanisms to monitor the truce.​

The ceasefire was not purely regional diplomacy, as it leaned heavily on phone calls from President Donald Trump to both leaders. Trump explicitly linked continued fighting to the fate of US trade talks and existing tariffs, signaling that escalation would come with economic costs for both countries’ export‑dependent economies.​

By late October, with violations still reported and both sides trading accusations, Cambodia and Thailand signed an expanded ceasefire in Kuala Lumpur with Trump physically present as a “peace mediator.” The so-called enhanced deal built on the earlier truce and included commitments to withdraw heavy artillery from the border, release 18 Cambodian prisoners of war, and form an ASEAN observer mission. These were steps meant to turn a more symbolic ceasefire into a more enforceable security deal.

The expanded ceasefire also addressed the landmine issue that had helped trigger the crisis, pledging joint efforts to clear mines in border zones that are both militarized and populated. Yet even in this phase, both capitals continued to accuse the other of violations, underlining how fragile the arrangement remained.

The latest round of violence, including Thai airstrikes along the border and fresh displacement of thousands of civilians, demonstrates how quickly ground realities can outrun diplomatic declarations. Thai officials argue that renewed operations are a response to Cambodian provocations and ongoing security threats, while Cambodian authorities say Thai attacks have killed civilians in border provinces.

For external actors, especially the US and China, the fighting raises uncomfortable questions about the limits of leverage. Trump’s earlier phone diplomacy and the October ceremony produced two nominal ceasefires in less than four months, yet neither has fully resolved the underlying dispute or generated mutual trust at the tactical level. For ASEAN, the conflict again exposes an institutional gap between its aspirations as a regional security manager and its dependence on big‑power pressure to stop member states from fighting.​

In the short term, the key variables are whether commanders on both sides adhere to agreed rules, such as bans on firing at civilians and halting troop reinforcements, and whether the ceasefire architecture is upgraded from political pledge to verifiable regime. Overall, the effect of these strikes have yet to be fully seen, but it is certain that relations are not warming up any time soon.

Read more here:

• Amelia Nierenberg, New York Times

• Mahima Kapoor, DW

• Helen Regan, Kocha Olarn, CNN