The Big Red Button: China’s Offensive Nuclear Modernization

China currently has the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, yet the US’ arsenal is over eight times larger than China’s. Like other aspects of Sino-American competition, China is attempting to catch up to the US in the nuclear weapons game, and the gap is closing at an alarming speed, sending red signals for global stability.

China’s nuclear story began in the 1950s, when it engaged in a secret deal with the Soviet Union, its Communist ally; in exchange for China’s unwavering support for the Soviet Union, China would receive enriched uranium for its nuclear program. Despite the withdrawal of Soviet support in 1960, China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964 and its first nuclear bomb in 1966. China quickly developed a simple but impactful doctrine regarding nuclear weapons: No First Use (NFU). Then-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Zedong viewed nuclear weapons as strategic deterrents, which only require second-strike capabilities. From Mao’s perspective, nuclear weapons were deterrents, preventing nuclear powers such as the US from using nuclear weapons to intimidate China into subjugation, as it did during the Korean War. Zhou Enlai, Chinese Prime Minister at the time, frequently used the term “nuclear blackmail” to articulate how Western powers would treat China if it did not possess a nuclear weapon, also echoing that China itself would refrain from using nuclear weapons to threaten other nations. Mao’s NFU doctrine lasted for decades following his death. Chairmen Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao maintained NFU policies because they understood their centrality to China’s major power status. Not only did China vow to follow NFU itself, but it aimed to spread its nuclear philosophy across the world. Chairman Jiang joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, promising to cap its nuclear arsenal at 1992 warhead numbers.

China’s long-practiced NFU doctrine has been put into question by Xi Jinping. Since becoming president in 2012, Xi has shaped Chinese foreign policy into a more expansionist and aggressive one. To a greater extent than previous leaders, aimed at seizing territory and creating a establish of influence in the Indo-Pacific. To achieve China’s strategic goals in the region, Xi has centralized military policymaking. By putting organs that Xi has more control over in charge of military strategy, Xi has changed two-thirds of military rules and regulations. As a result, Xi has ensured the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operates in his image.

China’s militarization under Xi is that of a nation on a wartime footing, including its transformation from a passive to an aggressive developer of nuclear weapons. Pan Zhenqiang, a former PLA General, argued in 2018 that “giving up the no-first-use policy would mean dramatically expanding China’s nuclear arsenal,” but considering that China is already rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, China has already taken the steps to abandon NFU. China has broken its promise since joining the NPT, going from approximately 300 warheads in 1992 to 600 warheads in 2025. More alarmingly, China is developing weapons that are more likely to be viewed as offensive tactical weapons, not strategic warheads designed to threaten massive retaliation as part of a deterrence strategy. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are the most powerful nuclear weapons, generally taking longer to reach targets than air-launched or submarine-based nuclear weapons, which can be launched much closer to targets. This makes ICBMs a logical focus for an NFU nuclear power such as China. Now, as a part of its transition away from NFU, China is shifting its procurement to tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). TNWs are low-yield warheads, and while low-yield development may seem less aggressive, TNWs are the most likely warheads to be deployed on the battlefield. Russia has notoriously wielded TNWs to intimidate Ukraine, showing their potential as first-strike weapons. China has invested in TNWs by developing the Dong Feng-26 (DF-26), a warhead that the Department of Defense (DoD) claims is most likely to be used by China. The DF-26 can either be used as a conventional (non-nuclear) warhead or as a nuclear warhead, giving it targets ranging from battleships to US naval bases in Guam and Puerto Rico. The DF-26’s ambiguity is intentional, allowing China to develop an offensive posture and providing strategic flexibility. Additionally, China’s procurement of stealth bombers ships and submersible, ballistic, and nuclear submarines (SSBNs) indicates prioritization of mobility in its nuclear arsenal. While a mobile nuclear arsenal does not necessarily entail a shift away from NFU, a mobile arsenal makes it easier for China to carry out a first strike.

China’s shift away from NFU and toward an offensive nuclear posture enhances China’s coercion toolkit. Like any nuclear strategy, China’s offensive strategy means less that China will use first-strike capabilities on its Indo-Pacific foes (including the US) and more that China will flaunt its offensive capabilities to intimidate surrounding countries such as the Philippines into succumbing to Chinese expansion in the region. By doing so, China would be able to better claim sections of the South China Sea and expand recognition of Chinese control over Taiwan.

China’s nuclear modernization does not only mean new and improved nuclear weapons; rather, China’s modernization allows it to change its nuclear strategy in the Indo-Pacific theater. Evidently, the strategy is evolving into an offensive posture.

Read more here:

• John Lee and Lavina Lee, Hudson Institute

• William Burr, National Security Archive

• Benjamin Hautecouverture, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique

• Lee Ferran, Breaking Defense

• Adam Mount, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

• Alexander Mattalaer, Royal United Services Institute

• Peter Siciu, National Interest