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Railway Reborn: The Lobito Corridor

February 3, 2026
Lindsey Zhao and Ty Tan

Connecting the Atlantic port of Lobito, Angola, to the Copperbelt mining regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia is a railway reborn: The Lobito Corridor. Built upon the rehabilitated 120-year-old Benguela Railway, its geopolitical importance has recently been revived.

The Lobito Corridor is an operational 1,300+ km railway and logistics transport corridor between Angola, the DRC, and Zambia. It currently serves as a mineral export superhighway, but massive proposed upgrades could transform it into a catalyst for regional economic growth. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation already signed a $553 million loan to the Angolan railway in December 2025, with European, Chinese, Egyptian and Emirati investors simultaneously pledging billions more.

The Lobito Corridor is quickly becoming a test ground for foreign engagement and development in Africa. This is because the extraction countries, the DRC and Zambia, have major mineral reserves, with the DRC holding over 75% of the world’s cobalt and the DRC-Zambia holding over 13% of global copper. Driven by climate transition and strategic technological demands, critical minerals in these countries are a requirement for growth. To take control of this supply chain, foreign powers are hedging their bets on the Lobito Corridor.

Consequently, the Lobito Corridor is ensnared in competition, where various countries invest via differing models—American instrumentalism, European sustainable partnerships, Chinese infrastructure development, and South-South cooperation. Looking forward, interactions between competing frameworks will either generate genuine economic growth or simply create efficient, exploitative extraction by their international investors.

First, the US and EU have recently been partnering to invest in the Lobito Corridor. The US has already invested over $4 billion in the project, with the investment deal elevating Angola’s geopolitical importance to the West and encouraging the development of sustainable green infrastructure in southern Africa. Similarly, most of the EU’s investment has been through its “Global Gateway” framework, a new European strategy to focus on partnerships that bring smart, clean, and secure links in the digital, energy, and transport sectors. They have recently mobilized over €2 billion in investments, and they are working with the US and the three African countries to develop a governance plan for the corridor. They are both investing massively in renovating rail and energy infrastructure (like a railroad and EV charging stations) to counter growing Chinese influence and promote a green infrastructure revolution in southern Africa.

Where the US and EU’s interests have begun to diverge starts with the Trump administration. It underscores the corridor’s importance that it is one of the few foreign initiatives that President Trump has not pulled out of since taking office last year. However, he has altered the aim of US investment; rather than being framed as a “flagship climate-transition project,” as it was under President Biden, the recent loan signed by the US IDFC—and recent letters of interest released by the corporation—imply that priorities have shifted towards securing rare earth supply chains and great power competition with China instead. America’s openness to oil and gas investments under Trump supports Angola’s existing dependency on hydrocarbons, while European clean-energy financing seems aspirational at best right now.

If Europe wants to be taken seriously as a powerful international actor, it should move from hopes of a green world to action, including deploying projects and finances faster and accepting greater risk to actually bring its projects to fruition. On the other hand, while Trump’s willingness to invest in hydrocarbons will please Angola, it will continue to destroy efforts at climate progress in the country and continue to pollute local communities.

Second, China’s deep interest in the region comes because its mining and infrastructure sectors have long benefited from China’s Belt and Road Initiative investments. For example, one of China’s railway construction groups funded a $2 billion renovation (through debt-trap loaning) of the Lobito Corridor from 2006 to 2014, which created over 25,000 local jobs. China already owns 80% of the DRC’s copper mines; thus, the corridor is already dependent on Chinese companies that export minerals from the DRC and Zambia. Naturally, they want to expand this influence to the corridor that ships their minerals, even amidst recently declining BRI investment.

Their distinction from US investment is that they offer more comprehensive, albeit less transparent, investment packages: they provide tailored training programs, technical assistance, maritime security and infrastructure protection against extremists. On the other hand, Western investment has tended to be more dependent on American domestic politics and heavily conditioned.

Finally, even South-South countries are getting in on the action. South-South countries are generally defined as the Global South, in this case, the Arab states, such as Egypt, the UAE and South Africa. Currently, Angola is seeking $4.5 billion to extend its railways throughout Zambia’s Copperbelt, a project that Egypt has expressed interest in supporting. By having Egyptian companies participate in the Corridor, Egypt hopes to expand its export markets and develop strategic partnerships. Egypt also has the potential to deploy its construction expertise, much like China, toward Angolan infrastructure in the Lobito Corridor. Additionally, the UAE has invested in Angola. Following President Mohammed bin Zayed's visit in August 2025, the Abu Dhabi and Dubai sovereign funds have found a renewed interest in Angola, funding agro-industrial and renewable projects up to 3 billion USD. While not in the Lobito Corridor, the UAE’s interests are clearly aimed at growing its regional influence. Finally, South Africa has been involved, with the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) committing to a $200 million senior debt loan for the $753 million Lobito Atlantic Railway (LAR) project in Angola.

Together, these models offer alternative methods of financing and support as opposed to the major global powers. Unbound by colonial baggage, South-South engagement through third powers can be less conditional than the EU and more flexible than the US. However, such diversified capital, while good for stability, hurts long-term planning by splitting the budget across multiple actors.

Thus, as foreign interests fight for control, Angola, alongside the DRC and Zambia, must harmonize its approaches to balancing partnerships. With proper alignment, competing foreign interests could be channeled toward common, developmental goals. However, poor execution could lead to bureaucratic delays. Realistically, there are three routes Angola takes:

Thinking more optimistically, there’s the possibility for strong US funding support, conditional developmental assistance from the EU, and Chinese industrial efficiency to all coalesce under a common Angolan framework, creating a multi-partner coalition that heightens extraction efficiency. This could work, as examples like Ivanhoe Atlantic Inc, which is American-based but also has Chinese state-owned enterprises, have succeeded well toward development in Africa despite international criticism. Funding across the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) as well—ranging from Western, Asian, and Arab sources—proves proper cooperation could yield the best results. However, such thinking is too optimistic. Misaligned incentives between the US and China stymie any chance for Angola to broker a mutual cooperative framework. Even if they apply the Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency (LCTTFA), their capacity is still insufficient to coordinate such a feat.

A more pessimistic scenario also exists. If Angola is unable to balance competing conditionalities, implementation paralysis will occur, leading the US, EU, China, and Arab states to all withdraw from their overwhelming support. This is already happening to an extent. The Trump Administration is deprioritizing Africa, withdrawing from USAID as a result. Furthermore, China is investing in revamping the 1,860-km Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA), a direct, high-capacity competitor to the Lobito Corridor. By revamping TAZARA to challenge the Lobito Corridor, China has the potential to divert cargo from the Corridor itself. For the Lobito Corridor, documented problems—slow disbursements, overlapping donor procedures, and limited coordination—alongside delays to developments, such as the DRC Dilolo-Kolwezi rail, demonstrate the potential for the Lobito Corridor to fail. At this rate, even if rails are built, implementation analysis could mean expansions are underutilized. The impact is lamented by Angolan Journalist Rafael Marques de Morais, who writes, “In truth, it is a mirror of everything negative the continent endures: Chinese debt, Western opportunism, Congolese blood, Angolan misrule—and a railway that connects foreign interests more efficiently than it connects the people who live along its tracks. It promises prosperity while delivering the same old extraction dressed in new flags.”

Thus, a pragmatic path toward sustainable development lies in a proper management of competing interests and actions. Angola should work to ensure competition benefits African states by establishing strong, international frameworks for investment in the Lobito Corridor. The potential for linking the Lobito and TAZARA projects could also address competing interests and create maximum transport efficiency across all of West Africa. This could see Zambia become a regional hub, one that allows the DRC’s minerals to flow East and West. Angola would also be able to continue to balance competing foreign powers, rejecting the need for the adoption of exclusion partnerships.

The balancing act Angola is playing requires it to check every foreign relationship carefully. If they’re able to rise to the challenges of the Lobito Corridor and their own domestic challenges—government corruption, private ownership in mining, rising transport costs and more—then their success in the Lobito Corridor could be guaranteed.

So, despite billions pledged and visits from foreign presidents, the future of the Lobito Corridor will be decided by the ability of local governments to prioritize industrialization over extraction. In balancing competing models, Angola’s centricity in great-power competition gives it the capacity to find a balanced, pragmatic model for growth in the Lobito Corridor. The world is watching this railway; Africa must ensure it’s not watching the same old story, but a story of a railway reborn.