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Turning Toward the Centre: the Erosion of Liberal Politics in Japan

January 20, 2026
Ty Tan

On a chilly December morning, the Asahi Shimbun captured the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), Yoshihiko Noda, handing out flyers to passersby near a train station. Compared to the past, Yoshihiko noted how his flyers have recently gained more traction, a positive sign for the party. Yet for Japan’s opposition, a moderate shift toward political viability may come at a high ideological cost.

Since October of this year, Japan’s new Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, has been leading with a hardline, conservative agenda. Her popularity stems from clarity and assertiveness, as her policies, such as her hawkish foreign policy and expansive economic security actions, have been praised. However, a Jiji Press survey highlighted that approval for Takaichi fell 3.9 points in December of this year, hinting that her approval might steadily follow the path of her predecessors. As pressure from the right is pushing Takaichi’s conservative agenda forward, moderate voters are being actively alienated.

Since the July 2025 House of Councillors election, international media attention on Japanese politics has focused on Sanseito, a far-right, conservative party that advocates for a “Japanese First” approach. In these elections, Sanseito won an astonishing 17 seats, applying their influence and presence to radicalize Japanese politics, thus forcing the LDP to do the same. Through its presence, Sanseito is shifting the discourse surrounding issues like immigration and educational reform toward new hard lines. While not working together, the ideological harmony between the conservative agendas of the LDP and Sanseito expands the Overton window on many issues that divide Japanese voters. While this forces the LDP to adjust by furthering its hard-right stance, it creates a moderate vacuum for the CDP to exploit through an ideological shift.

Specifically, the CDP is now beginning to threaten the LDP’s rule by garnering the trust of moderates who fear the radicalism present in the LDP and Sanseito. However, by working to slowly shore up support with Komeito and the Democratic Party For the People (DPFP), the CDP, the leader of liberalism in Japan, is deviating from its long-standing reputation, creating political viability without ideology as a central organizing strategy.

Modern Japanese liberalism has been based on coalitions, solidified in 1998 with the formation of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The primary ideals of Japanese Liberalism have been constitutional protection and opposition to securitization, among others. After two decades of leadership, the DPJ’s eventual dissolution led to the emergence of two new champions for Japanese liberalism: the CDP and DPFP.

According to the CDP Constitution, the party upholds various key tenets, ranging from protecting the constitution to diplomatic cooperation, all policies commonly associated with Japanese Liberalism. Similarly, the DPFP also represents ‘liberals’ and moderates, pushing primarily for income, resident, and consumption tax reductions. In tandem, the CDP and DPFP are the last bastion of liberalism in Japanese society, representing those who exercise more restraint than the current government of the LDP. But now, this Liberal identity risks becoming coalition-based without an ideological program.

Thus, as Japan’s opposition circles around a unity bid, the CDP’s shift toward moderate politics is eroding the identity of Japanese liberalism. Although not definitive, the CDP, DPFP, and Komeito appear to be coalescing for a new unity around a singular candidate. For the CDP, their approach to Komeito is deliberate and restrained, as they are testing the “barely acceptable line” for cooperation. By shifting toward the middle, the CDP is becoming moderate enough to tempt Komeito to create a new viable coalition.

Thus, for the CDP primarily, their liberal project is the cost of coalition viability. While forecasting Japan’s next elections is impossible, forming a coalition with Komeito presents the CDP as a more moderate figure in Japanese politics, giving them the chance to succeed electorally. Furthermore, as the LDP faces criticism over its provocative Taiwan stance, a moderate shift for the LDP may even destabilize LDP dominance.

Worryingly for Japanese Liberalism, the loss of the CDP and DPFP as their champions threatens to mute certain debates, such as the future of constitutional reform. As support for constitutional reform steadily grows, this muted debate seems inevitable. Additionally, a moderate shift risks soft-pedaling language surrounding civil liberties, as even if courts protect same-sex marriage, the CDP might be less rhetorically salient when discussing such issues.

However, many analysts are calling the CDP pragmatic, saying their shift toward Komeito is strategic and that ideology is secondary to electoral viability. This stance denies Japan’s modern political environment, which effectively dictates that an ideology deferred is ideology denied. If parties redefine themselves around coalition-building rather than normative ideological policies—like the CDP is actively doing—returning to their liberal ideological roots is irrational. While the CDP’s strategy may be reversible in theory, it is not in practice. Thus, Japan’s opposition is moving toward the middle, abandoning liberal ambition for coalition viability. For Japanese Liberals, this means that their future won’t be in losing elections, but rather, in losing any reason to be liberal.