Beijing’s Dismantling of Hong Kong Democracy

October 14th, 2025
Patrick Li

Just four months ago, emotional tears rolled down the grief-stricken face of Chan-Po-ying, the chairwoman of Hong Kong’s League of Social Democrats (LSD), as she spoke on the sheer impossibility of operating her party amid “the omnipresence of red lines and the draconian suppression of dissent.” Her grief encapsulates the mood of an Asian city, once embodying pluralism, that now stands as a cautionary tale of how swiftly democracy can vanish in the face of authoritarianism.

Five years ago, Hong Kong—once protected under the umbrella-esque premise of “one country, two systems”—was indisputably China’s most fiscally and culturally open city. Harboring billions of dollars in foreign investment and capital, it was lauded as a ‘utopia’ of East-Asian thought and freedom of expression. This changed almost overnight. In 2020, Beijing promptly instituted the National Security Law (NLS), unequivocally deeming the “subversion, secession, and collusion with foreign powers” illegal. Within just months, thousands of local activists, including Chan-Po-ying, were jailed; newspapers and radio stations were raided by CCP-affiliated police; and protests were crushed. Empowering local authorities to push out lawmakers is deemed unpatriotic, Beijing disbanded that year’s Legislative Council election.

In January 2021, 47 LSD opposition figures were arrested by police for holding a primary election—one of many nails in the coffin that would soon shatter the city’s political opposition. Beijing swiftly overhauled the system so that only “patriots” could run. When the first cycle of “patriots only” elections was held that December, voter turnout collapsed to 30 percent, embodying increasing public despair.

The election of CCP-backed John Lee, a former Hong Kong security chief who became Chief Executive in 2022 via an uncontested vote, further cemented Beijing’s influence (in tandem with an already pro-CCP “patriots-only” supermajority in the legislative council). Four months into his term, he slashed directly-elected district council seats from 452 to 88, a sharp turnaround for loyalist dominance—originally confined to the federal Legislative Council system—to now begin to emerge at the local level. As a direct result, more civil and pro-democracy groups disbanded, teachers’ unions collapsed and unprecedented ‘film-censorship’ laws were passed—banning politically sensitive content.

In March of 2024, the Legislative Council passed “Article 23,” expanding the grounds on which the NLS offenses of treason, espionage and “state secrets” could be enforced. Critically, the legislation granted sweeping federal power to detain, seize assets and silence NGOs. Two months later, 45 of the original 47 LSD opposition figures—via Article 23—were convicted on the grounds of subversion; many were sentenced to nearly a decade in prison.

By the end of 2024, Chan Po-ying’s League of Social Democrats, the last Hong Kong pro-democracy opposition group and party, teetered on collapse. Today, it’s virtually erased.

What remains now is an objectively hollowed-out political landscape. The Legislative Council contains almost no opposition to pro-CCP ideals, universities teach Beijing-ordained “patriotic education,” newsrooms self-censor and mainland cultural festivals—originally objected to by many Hong Kongers—have been stripped of dissent. Regardless, Hong Kong still remains an economic powerhouse in serving as East Asia’s financial hub to the West. Yet, the growing exodus of professionals and fading investor confidence reveal deeper cracks that can be directly attributed to its now dubious politics.