Endless Execration: Ethiopia and Eritrea

October 7th, 2025
Ty Tan

Eritrea was once one of Africa’s most industrialized nations, poised to become a global leader. Yet, Isaias Afwerki—Eritrea’s strongman President, who’s been in power since 1993—has turned the clock on history. Even worse, it seems the clock is turning back to Afwerki’s glory days—as Ethiopia seeks to begin a new “war” with Eritrea. As a grim premonition from a former senior Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) stated: another war between Ethiopia and Eritrea “appears inevitable.”

Context

Since Eritrea’s secession in 1993, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been rough. However, when Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, a serious rapprochement began. At the 2018 Eritrea–Ethiopia peace summit, Eritrea and Ethiopia ended border tensions and reopened full diplomatic relations. This renewed friendship was tested in November 2020, when the Tigray war broke out in Ethiopia’s northern province. The TPLF had once been an ally of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in the three-decade secessionist fight led by Afwerki, but had now become their next enemy. The ensuing violence left thousands displaced throughout the region, but notably ended with the fragile signing of the Pretoria Agreement, a peace treaty agreeing to a “permanent cessation of hostilities.” Although Ethiopia was left triumphant, Eritrea and the TPLF were no longer on their side. Specifically, insiders have noted that Abiy Ahmed initially sought cooperation with the TPLF to stabilize Tigray through cooperation with Ethiopia’s government. However, the TPLF has found tactical alignment with Afwerki instead. In a classic case of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” Ethiopia’s expansionist ambitions have triggered a swift alliance of convenience between the TPLF and Eritrea.

The Potential for War

Similar to 2020, 2025 has seen Ethiopia and Eritrea ramp up their aggression. After Eritrea mobilized its military in February, Ethiopia deployed troops toward the Eritrean border in March. The restart of this conflict has also triggered TPLF forces to mobilize, as violence by the TPLF and Fano proliferates in Tigray. Multiple Ethiopian media outlets have reported multiple TPLF attempts to take control of the disputed territory, with Eritrean forces also present in the region. Like Eritrea and the TPLF, Ethiopia is eying territory as well. On September 27, the Ethiopian army declared it would “pay any sacrifice” to win back the port of Assab, a critical port that would give Ethiopia greater Red Sea access. Driven by a belief in his drones and military, Abiy Ahmed’s appeal to Ethiopian nationalism has vehemently rejected this apparent “Greater Tigray” that the TPLF and Eritrea are vying for.

Yet, the potential for war is not imminent. Not only are Ethiopia, Eritrea and the TPLF stretched for resources, but the region is still reeling from the humanitarian costs of the Tigray war. Rather than a large-scale conflict, a low-intensity proxy conflict appears to be brewing, indicated by Ethiopia’s ambitions of ceasing the port of Assab and Eritrean troops coalescing alongside TPLF soldiers. This slow pressure cooker raises serious concerns for international meddling, which will certainly occur should any conflict manifest with boots on the ground.

Conclusion

Afwerki and Ahmed are both strongman leaders: two people with egos too large to step down from. Thus, although Ethiopia and Eritrea continue to be labelled as a post-conflict context, these nations sit on the cusp of conflict. The world is watching to see if these nations turn back the clock, returning to conflict all over again.