France’s Centrist Decline

October 7th, 2025
Patrick Li

On September 23, French President Emmanuel Macron took the stage at the UN General Assembly and delivered 2 landmark speeches: one finally declaring France’s recognition of a Palestinian state, and one specifically addressing his supporters, reminding them ‘why they voted for him.’ Declaring that “We have no right to cynicism…[and] fatigue” and that “We have no right to the spirit of defeat,” it is abundantly clear that Mr. Macron remains a steadfast figure in foreign affairs. Yet, despite his tenacious enthusiasm in diplomacy, no amount of effort can mask what is genuinely occurring at home: the crippling of his great centrist venture.

When Sebastien Lecornu—France’s newly appointed PM—and his team take office, it will alarmingly be the country’s fifth government in nearly two years, a rate not seen since the dubious Fourth Republic of the 1950s. Yet, France still plays a bulk part in shaping the EU’s future, making its sheer political instability, completely gridlocked parliament, and doomed public finances all the more worrying. The empirical truth is that if the broad centrist parties cannot overcome their differences, the chance of power falling into the hands of the politically extreme will be all the more likely.

However, support for the broader centre is collapsing. The number of seats held by the National Rally (Ms. Le Pen’s far-right party) has shot up from 8 to 123 since 2016; Jean-Luc Melenchon’s hard-left Unsubmissive France from 17 to 71. Specifically for the presidential vote—not due until 2027—an Ifop poll on September 29 strongly suggests that Ms. Le Pen would comfortably be situated in the next second-round run-off with 33%, with the best-placed centrist candidate—Edourd Philippe, quite literally a former PM, being only at 16%, hardly even qualifying for the run-off at all.

One predominant answer behind this decisive shift is rooted in a series of blatant, easily inferrable miscalculations. In 2022, Macron was reelected on the basis of unity, yet failed to campaign effectively for the legislative election that followed—leading to the loss of his parliamentary majority. According to Alexandre Holroyd, one of his former deputies, “that was the real turning point.” And yet, instead of seeking compromise and coalition with centre-right Republicans, he quite ignorantly—critics say—pushed on with a weak and feeble minority government; most notably trying to ram pension reform through parliament without a vote, stirring popular resentment. His decision to rashly dissolve parliament last year further shrank his minority and further entrenched the deadlock. As of now, Mr. Macron’s popularity has fallen to 22%, a record low.

This leaves the French center—much like the rest of Europe—scrambling on the defensive. Socially, most who came from the left are quite uneasy on taking the right-leaning hard line on immigration, one of many divisions over both social and fiscal matters. Budgetary drifts, in tandem with everything else, have also further compounded unpopularity. Mr Macron’s appeal for a vote against RN and the broader far-right in the past was all about competence as well as values. Yet, through the lens of today, this seems like an increasingly difficult case to make when the deficit is running at 5.4% of GDP, and bond markets are edgy.

Regardless, today, the centre ground looks more fragile than ever.