The 28 Point Plan for Ukraine
November 25, 2025
Blake McFalls
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November 25, 2025
Blake McFalls
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, an estimated four hundred thousand Ukrainian soldiers have died or been wounded in the fighting. The crossfire between the two nations has cost 15,000 Ukrainian civilians their lives, and forced 7 million out of their homes. The growing humanitarian, economic, and military costs of the war are increasingly difficult to bear, as hope of victory grows faint. In the face of continued tragedy, Ukrainian support for the war has begun to collapse: 69% of Ukrainian respondents to an August Gallup poll said they would favor a negotiated end to the war as soon as possible. Only 24% continue to prefer fighting until victory.
Similarly, most political actors across the world wish for the end of the war in Ukraine, and President Donald Trump has made it a key point in his administration to achieve peace between Ukraine and Russia. Although he has consistently fallen short, he seems more confident than ever that the war is coming to a close.
For peace to last, a deal must set standards for peacetime affairs, create mechanisms by which both Ukraine and NATO are protected from Russian aggression, reduce hostile sentiment between Russia and Ukraine, and be sufficiently attractive to Russia in order to ensure long-lasting peace.
Two of Trump’s foreign policy advisors, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, recently revealed a 28-point plan to end the war in Ukraine, spanning from de-escalation to reconstruction. Allegations of Russian influence in the construction of this peace plan that appears to favor Russia have tainted this plan’s revelation, causing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to release his own, heavily-altered version of the plan that removes many of Russia’s demands.
This article will break down all 28 points from President Trump’s proposed peace plan and examine their likely impacts on regional security, Ukraine’s future, US relations with Russia, Ukraine, and NATO, and Russia’s prospects across Eurasia. If you don’t have time to read all of this, the most important points are 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 19, 21, 25, and 26. Most other points will likely have a limited impact on the status quo.
Extreme TLDR: Most provisions tend to favor Russia, with many peacekeeping/reconstruction/aggression points remaining effectively unenforceable. Russia would gain Ukrainian territory and immunity from prosecution for war crimes. Ukraine would be blocked from joining NATO but eligible for the EU. Sanctions will be lifted from Russia on a case-by-case basis.
Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed.
Ukraine’s sovereignty was never a question before the peace talks, so this does not change anything. However, the fact that this was the first point in the plan could be indicative of Trump’s priorities.
A full and comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered resolved.
It was to be assumed that after an end to the war was negotiated, Russia was not to continue military incursions, so barring Russia from attacking does not signify any meaningful shift. However, enforcement of the agreement would be tricky. In theory, NATO’s Article 5 should consider a Russian attack on a member state as an attack on all, but Russia got away with gray-zone incursions into the Baltic States back in October, and continues to engage in hybrid warfare on NATO through drone tactics, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns. Russia may also use the past narrative—that Ukraine’s attempts to join NATO started the war—to justify breaking the agreement in the future. And of course, a non-aggression pact would not ease grievances from the past among either government.
Russia will not invade neighbouring countries, and NATO will not expand further.
Prohibiting Russian expansion into neighboring countries is materially different from prohibiting Russian expansion in Ukraine. Experts reckon that after the war ends in Ukraine, Putin’s next target will be outside of Ukraine. This may be the Baltic States, but more likely, Russia would focus on a country outside of NATO, such as Moldova. Once again, enforcing a prohibition on Russian aggression would be difficult, but preventing Russia from expanding its sphere of influence is a paradigm shift. More consequential is a halt to NATO expansion. Trump was always tentative about immediate membership for Ukraine, yet 20 of the 32 countries in NATO signed security guarantees with Ukraine that effectively promised they would support a NATO ascension bid by Ukraine, indicating where the Alliance wants to go. The best route to NATO cohesion on Ukrainian security would be to remove inconsistencies in security guarantees, which would come through Ukrainian NATO membership. Ruling this out leaves Ukraine vulnerable to further Russian aggression in the future without any permanent promises of NATO membership. At the same time, this point makes Russia more likely to yield to potential tweaks in the future that would favor Ukraine, particularly European counterprovisions on Ukrainian military buildup.
A US-mediated dialogue will be held between Russia and NATO to resolve security issues, create conditions for de-escalation, ensure global security, and improve opportunities for cooperation and future economic growth.
Historically, dialogue between NATO and Russia has been notoriously unsuccessful. The last time Russia met with NATO was in January 2022, when NATO attempted to prevent Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Evidently, this failed, as fundamental disputes over sovereignty remained. Trump floated a revival of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) earlier this year, but history suggests it will not be successful. Still, the effort itself would improve Russo-American relations and could improve Russo-European relations if Europe is incorporated properly.
Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.
American security guarantees would quell fears that the US would use the lack of official NATO guarantees to ignore the needs of Ukraine after the war ends. Given Trump’s resistance to Ukrainian access to Article 5 (which promises that if one NATO country is attacked, the entire alliance is compelled to respond), the US is unlikely to guarantee intervention if Ukraine is attacked, especially as the US is likely to run the provisions by Putin. More plausibly, the US’ guarantee could mean American military gear on the new border. The Trump Administration has shown it remains willing to provide weapons for Ukraine, whether through a $100bn deal of Ukrainian purchases of American arms or Trump’s consideration of Tomahawk missile shipments. A larger mobilization of these weapons would strengthen Ukraine. Additionally, European security guarantors would wield more power. Britain and France have been working on a plan to put NATO boots on the ground in the future; both countries have desired American military placement and intelligence sharing to back them up, which is best achieved if Ukraine has security guarantees from the US
The size of Ukraine’s Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel.
A cap on Ukraine’s armed forces would have a limited impact. Currently, Ukraine has 900,000 active duty personnel, yet 1,200,000 in reserve. If Ukraine is forced to cut active duty personnel by 300,000, extra troops could simply be moved into reserves. The primary difference between reserve and active duty troops is that reserve troops are less experienced and held to lower standards of training than active duty troops; Ukraine could continue to train transferred troops and still abide by the provision. The Europeans have proposed a cap of 800,000 instead. More generally, it is questionable whether any limitation on army size is consistent with respect to Ukraine’s sovereignty, previously discussed in point 1.
Ukraine will enshrine in its Constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO will adopt a provision stating that Ukraine will not be admitted at any time in the future.
Point 3’s prevention of NATO expansion holds the same effect as preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, except for who the prohibition on Ukrainian NATO membership applies to. By forcing Ukraine to agree, the point would make Ukraine in violation of the agreement if it were to join NATO. As point 26 details, Ukraine would be sanctioned if it were to violate the agreement. The European counterprovision slightly tweaks the prohibition, stating Ukraine will not join NATO in the short term, but can later down the line. If the counterprovision were implemented, Ukraine would no longer be forced to prohibit NATO membership in its constitution, which could potentially lead to more ambiguity. The American provision takes membership out of the question, while the European provision still leaves membership on the table, which could upset Russia and give it an excuse to denounce the treaty in the future.
NATO will not deploy its troops in Ukraine.
Security guarantees from NATO member states would be heavily stifled by this provision. It would make the more aggressive countries in the Alliance, Britain and France, unable to fulfill their potential commitments to mobilize troops if another conflict breaks out. Through the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), NATO troops are also responsible for stationing military equipment, such as tanks and missile defense systems. Thus, NATO efforts to arm the Ukrainian border with NATO gear would be impaired, as soldiers best experienced with NATO weaponry would be unable to ready equipment in case of attack or military threat. Circling back to point 5, the most likely US security guarantee for Ukraine is more armament, so a lack of manpower to implement the guarantee would make it far less effective for Ukrainian security.
European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.
NATO’s fighter jets are already primarily stationed in Poland. Earlier this year, Germany stationed its Eurofighter jets in Poland, and the US is sending Poland its F-35 and F-16 fighter jets. This is largely because Poland, the largest contributor to NATO defense by spending as a share of GDP, is a natural geopolitical center for NATO’s posture in Eastern Europe. A requirement for an otherwise logical process to occur will have little impact on NATO’s functional operations.
US security guarantees:
The US will receive compensation for providing guarantees.
If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantees.
If Russia invades Ukraine (except for a rapid coordinated military response), all global sanctions will be restored, and recognition of new territories will be revoked.
If Ukraine unintentionally fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg, the guarantees become invalid.
While a surefire military response from the US may sound like an Article 5-type guarantee, it would not be used as such, despite the Europeans mentioning Article 5 in their counterprovision. The goal of these 28 points is to bring both sides to the negotiating table, so explicit security guarantees could be overstated by Trump in order to shore up Ukraine.
A US military response, required under a security guarantee, could mean intelligence sharing or arms shipments to Ukraine, both commonplace under the Biden Administration and returning to normalcy under the Trump Administration. Then again, the threat of a greater military response could deter Putin to a larger degree.
The US receiving compensation for its guarantees likely means the financial resources the US expends to aid Ukraine’s military would be repaid to the US, which is a condition the Trump Administration already expects in its arms shipments to Ukraine.
A prevention of a Ukrainian invasion of Russia may sound positive, but in reality, it would weaken the Ukrainian deterrent, as further detailed in point 22.
A resurgence of sanctions is not surprising, but would have mixed results in a scenario where Russia wages war on Ukraine after a period of peace.
The period without sanctions would allow Russian holders of previously frozen assets to pull out of the SWIFT banking system, removing the leverage NATO has in using the EU to siphon Russian cash to Ukraine’s war effort. Sanctions may succeed as a deterrent through oil sanctions; Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, which finances Russia’s war machine, has shrunk from $117bn to $31bn in the last four years due to sanctions on the oil sector. More sanctions would limit the amount of gains Russia could make in the event of a second invasion.
Sanctions may be valid deterrents, but if sanctions are not imposed on Russia, Russia would have more freedom to invade Ukraine. More ominously, part C states that sanctions would not be issued if Russia invades in a “rapid coordinated military response”. This is the type of ambiguity useful to Russia. In fact, China labeled the 2022 invasion in similar terms to the exception, so Russia could invade Ukraine and indignantly point to the provision in order to prevent the imposition of sanctions.
The point also says the US will not recognize any territory Russia swallows in a second invasion, but, as with the current situation, recognizing territorial losses on Ukraine’s end may be necessary in order to resolve a second conflict.
Thus, this aspect of the point has little resolve and would not contribute to a deterrent.
Finally, the point details that Ukraine would lose security guarantees if it attacks the two major Russian cities. Currently, Ukraine does not have any important military targets — which are primarily military bases, stockpiles, and oil refineries — directly in these two cities. However, if Russia is smart, it would move its important military resources and stockpiles to these cities, because Ukraine would not be able to strike the targets without losing its security guarantees.
Ukraine may apply for EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market pending review.
EU accession would have little security impact, but large political and economic impacts for both the EU and Ukraine. The EU has identified Ukraine as key to its efforts to secure raw materials, such as critical minerals, that feed high-tech industries. Streamlined access to EU labor and trade will affirm Ukraine’s strength in the tech sector; IT component exports have already tripled since the war started, and Ukraine has the fourth-most tech experts worldwide. Geopolitically, Ukrainian EU membership would provide mutual energy benefits. Ukraine’s geothermal, hydrogen, and natural gas sectors would provide greater energy security for Europe, and partial Ukrainian integration into the European grid has already insulated Eastern Ukraine from the electricity shocks it used to experience from the war; full integration would bolster that. This would be a positive economic move for Ukraine and would strengthen relations between Ukraine and Europe.
A global reconstruction package for Ukraine will include:
A fund for investing in high-tech sectors (transport, logistics, data centres, AI).
US–Ukraine cooperation on restoring and operating gas infrastructure (pipelines, storage).
Joint efforts to rebuild war-affected territories, cities, and residential areas.
Infrastructure development.
Extraction of minerals and natural resources.
A World Bank financing package to accelerate reconstruction.
It is hard to predict how the US would choose to use the high-tech package, but the real impact of US-led reconstruction would likely be centered around infrastructure repair. Previously, the US has not only provided funding for local initiatives in Ukraine, but technical assistance as well. In 2024, the US government contracted AECOM, an infrastructure firm based in Texas, to be the technical advisor for reconstruction projects in certain areas of Ukraine.
Funding for oil and gas repair could be the most important area of reconstruction. About 42% of Ukrainian gas production and storage capacity has been destroyed as a result of targeted Russian strikes. If the US were to completely finance the rebuilding of this infrastructure, it would cost at least $10.6bn. Though expensive, it would be a prerequisite for Ukraine to heat itself in the upcoming winter months.
Already, the US is invested in securing critical minerals from Ukraine. In April, Ukraine and the US agreed to a critical minerals deal, which mandates financing from the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Ukrainian oil, gas, and mineral firm revenues in order to launch new mining ventures. This point would likely maintain the terms of the April deal. Compared to previous iterations, the April deal benefits Ukraine in that Ukraine is not forced to provide the US with a share of its critical minerals or give up infrastructure ownership. Instead, the US can competitively bid for production of titanium, manganese, and more under Ukrainian discretion.
Judging by past Trump Administration support for foreign aid, the US would be a tentative financier of reconstruction as a whole, and thus, the World Bank would be central to this point.
Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy:
Sanctions relief will be discussed and agreed on individually and gradually.
The US will sign a long-term economic cooperation agreement with Russia covering energy, resources, infrastructure, AI, data centres, Arctic rare-earth mining, and other corporate opportunities.
Russia will be invited to return to the G8.
When it comes to sanctions, the most evident change will occur in the oil sector. Wishing to be on better terms with India and China, Trump would most likely remove the secondary tariff on countries that purchase Russian oil and gas quickly. Trump would also likely remove most direct oil and gas sanctions in order to please Putin. Natural resource cooperation may include oil and gas, but given Trump’s emphasis on absolute energy independence, Trump may go for more urgent resource cooperation. Considering US-Canada lumber disputes, the US could make Russia, which hosts 20% of the world’s forests, a trade competitor for Canada to deal with. AI cooperation, as always, is vague. A rejoining of the G8 would signify a reintegration of Russia into the global order, but it would not ease Russian concerns or complaints about the Western-led, rules-based international order.
Frozen Russian assets:
$100bn will be invested in US-led reconstruction projects in Ukraine.
The US will receive 50% of the profits from these projects.
Europe will add another $100bn for Ukraine’s reconstruction.
European frozen assets will be unfrozen.
Remaining Russian assets will be invested in a special US–Russia investment instrument for joint projects aimed at strengthening mutual interests and long-term stability.
As stated in point 10, if Russian assets are no longer frozen, Europe loses leverage against Russia. This point ensures Russian assets are unfrozen in some shape or form. The $100bn for Ukrainian reconstruction is considered the proper way to spend Russia’s liquidated assets, but the US share of the profit would harm the initiative. Since the US would take half of the financing for reconstruction, Europe would have less money to spend on reconstruction itself, reducing the reconstruction impact. A European investment quota would not be a new feature of regional politics; the EU put together an €800bn defense fund earlier this year focused on the Russian deterrent. Therefore, Europe would probably deliver. The rest of the formerly frozen Russian assets would be unfrozen, which, circling back to point 10, would give Russians the window to back out of the system for good. It is unclear where the remainder of seized Russian assets would come from, and a peace preservation fund seems too vague to have a material impact.
A joint US–Ukraine–Russia working group on security issues will be established to monitor compliance with the agreement.
A working group could mean another outlet for diplomatic coordination, but its enforcement function indicates a peacekeeping focus on the ground. If the working group is anything other than the Russian military, the working group would be unable to enforce provisions on Ukrainian armament and mobilization. It could, however, report any wrongdoing on the Ukrainian side. Additionally, it could oversee reconstruction, ensuring affairs run smoothly. Notably, Ukraine would have a very small part, if any, in this plan’s enforcement. This point would improve ties between the US and Russia, but potentially disconnect the US and Europe.
Russia will legally adopt a policy of non-aggression toward Europe and Ukraine.
As with other checks on Russia’s power, this point would be difficult to enforce and largely irrelevant. Even if Russia passes a law preventing aggression, Russia would be in charge of enforcing that law. Thus, it would be up to Russia whether non-aggression is practiced, which is essentially the status quo. Furthermore, Russia could simply deny wrongdoing in cases of aggression. After its drone incursions in Eastern Europe, which have been considered by experts to be intentional, Russia denied any wrongdoing. Both of these factors would make any form of retaliatory action tricky to administer, especially for the US
The US and Russia will extend nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear arms control treaties, including START-1.
For context, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I expired in 2009, which gave way to New START in 2011. New START limits the US and Russia’s deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550 each. More importantly, the treaty has an associated verification system that monitors the implementation of the treaty, with measures including on-site inspections of nuclear sites and data-sharing. While Russia still complies with the limits on warheads, it pulled out of the verification regime in 2023, meaning the US has had little mechanism to enforce the treaty. Last month, Putin called for an extension of the treaty, so this point would simply be US agreement to Russia’s request. Agreeing to Putin’s demands on nuclear proliferation is a high-stakes gamble, but if it pays off, Russia may reopen to the verification process. If it does not, Russia would be able to restrict the deployment of US weapons while reducing guardrails on its own deployment.
Ukraine will remain a non-nuclear state under the NPT.
Ukraine has historically followed this path very willingly. In 1994, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons and launch sites to Russia and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and START I with little guarantee of financial or security compensation from the US and Russia. Russia’s 2022 invasion has made Ukraine more wary of non-proliferation, but Ukraine does not have much choice, regardless. In 2010, Ukraine agreed to cede and stop producing highly-enriched uranium (HEU). In short, prohibiting Ukrainian nuclear proliferation would not change the current situation.
The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be restarted under IAEA supervision, with electricity output divided equally (50/50) between Russia and Ukraine.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has one purpose: to stop nuclear proliferation. Therefore, Trump’s interest in IAEA control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear plant in Europe, is tied to suspicions that Ukraine will use uranium from the plant to enrich fissile material for a nuclear weapon. This is misguided; whereas warhead-grade uranium is at least 20% enriched, uranium in nuclear plants (including the ZNPP) ranges from 3-5%.
The power-sharing agreement, on the other hand, will have material effects. Before the war, the ZNPP supplied Ukraine with 20% of Ukraine’s total electricity. Amidst Russian ground advances, Russia took unlawful control of the ZNPP, jeopardizing American technology that was used in the operation of the plant. Sharing the ZNPP with Russia would harm Ukraine’s grid reconstruction and normalize Russian gains on assets in which the US has a vested interest.
Both countries will implement educational programs fostering cultural tolerance, understanding, and the elimination of racism and prejudice:
Ukraine will adopt EU standards on religious tolerance and minority protection.
Both sides will lift discriminatory measures and guarantee equal access for Ukrainian and Russian media and education.
Nazi ideology and activity will be banned in both countries.
For the most part, education standards would not reduce negative sentiment from either country toward their counterpart. However, there is one group that could be helped by this measure: kidnapped Ukrainian children. Thousands of Ukrainian children living inside Russian-occupied territory have been sent to re-education facilities by the Russian military. These children are banned from speaking Ukrainian and forced to speak Russian instead. If the provision is actually enforced, Ukrainian children stuck in Russia would have better lives, ones that allow them to maintain a connection back to their homeland. Without an observation mechanism, though, this is unlikely to change Russia’s behavior. On another note, the fact that Ukraine, and not Russia, is required to adopt EU rules slants the provision slightly against Ukraine.
Territorial arrangements:
Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk will be recognized de facto as Russian, including by the United States.
Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the current front lines.
Russia renounces claims to any other territories it controls beyond these five regions.
Ukrainian troops will withdraw from the part of the Donetsk region they currently control; this zone becomes a demilitarized neutral buffer internationally recognized as Russian Federation territory. Russian forces will not enter the demilitarized zone.
The topic of territorial concessions was always going to be a tough pill to swallow for Ukraine. Unfortunately for Ukraine, conceding territory may be the only option. Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive only recaptured territory with a pre-war population of 5,000 people while consuming tremendous amounts of resources, meaning from an international perspective, Ukraine is unlikely to win much territory back from now on. Furthermore, throughout this week, Russia has made key gains in Zaporizhzhia, so freezing the frontlines could prevent Ukraine from losing more territory, particularly its communications center of Pokrovsk. A continuation of the war in Ukraine does not necessarily spell doom for Ukraine’s remaining territory, but any Ukrainian requests to return to pre-war borders would be rejected by Russia due to the state of affairs on the ground. A demilitarized zone is more concerning, though. Although a DMZ in Donetsk would slightly reduce the possibility of a second invasion in the future, the DMZ is likely to be located in territory that Russia does not yet control, particularly Donetsk Oblast. Plus, Russia may still keep military infrastructure in the zone if there is a lack of oversight.
Future territorial arrangements cannot be changed by force; security guarantees will not apply if violated.
None of the other points mentions security guarantees for Russia, so this provision essentially only applies to Ukraine. Ukraine was already unlikely to attack Russia unprovoked, but a more essential question is whether a Ukrainian counter-incursion would cost Ukraine security guarantees. Last year, Ukraine launched a mini-invasion into Kursk, Russia, which was heavily prepared and supported by the US and other NATO member states. If Russia can launch a second invasion, understanding that Ukraine would lose security guarantees if it mounts a counter-incursion, Russia would be more likely to take that action. Thus, this point’s impact on regional security is dependent on whether Ukraine would be able to invade Russia if Russia invades first, as the Ukrainian deterrent would be weakened otherwise.
Russia will not obstruct Ukraine’s commercial use of the Dnipro River, and agreements will be reached on free grain shipments via the Black Sea.
The primary way Russia initially sought to curb Ukrainian grain exports was to blockade the Dnipro River, Eastern Ukraine’s main route to the Black Sea. Over the course of the war, though, Ukraine found ways to circumvent the blockade. By using a combination of overland routes to the west and shallow waters along the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria, Ukraine prevented Russian ships and mines from sabotaging Ukraine’s grain exports. While an outright removal of Russian forces along the river would reduce the hardships of transport in the status quo, it would not fundamentally increase Ukrainian grain exports, as Ukraine has almost recovered from pre-war export levels.
A humanitarian committee will resolve outstanding issues:
Prisoners and bodies exchanged under “all for all.”
All civilian detainees and hostages returned, including children.
Family reunification program.
Measures to alleviate the suffering of conflict victims.
Similar to the US-Russia working group in point 15, a humanitarian committee would be ineffective unless it were to have enforcement mechanisms. Russia is unlikely to hand back Ukrainian children, no matter what, mostly because Russia has denied their kidnapping in the first place. If the humanitarian committee turns out to be effective in its scope, facilitating the exchange of hostages and easing tension between the sides following the war’s closure, grievances from the war would be softened. Prisoner swaps have been surprising points of agreement amidst conflict, and a humanitarian task force overseeing large-scale exchanges would accelerate this process.
Ukraine will hold elections within 100 days.
Although this seems logical on its face, Ukraine would not be ready to hold elections in 100 days even if the war ended today. Five groups’ voting ability would be significantly inhibited: 600,000 troops currently fighting, the 3.5 million people living in Russian-occupied Ukraine, inhabitants of areas of former hostilities, 4.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the 6.9 million refugees outside of Ukraine. The overarching reason why these groups would be unable to vote is a lack of supporting infrastructure, such as polling stations and communications, so if elections are rushed, Ukraine and the international community would not have enough time to resolve infrastructural deficiencies. Moreover, the populations unable to vote in snap elections are the populations most likely to vote for Zelenskyy’s party, the Servant of the People, as they are the most burdened by Russian aggression, causing them to gravitate toward the most anti-Russia candidates. Therefore, the election would improve Russia's prospects of increasing control over Ukrainian politics.
Additionally, nearly half of Ukrainians oppose remote voting, so physical infrastructure would, in fact, be necessary for proper democratic processes. Finally, quick elections would prompt Russian disinformation campaigns on social media, and without a Western response to combat it, Russia will proliferate. Overall, rushed elections would likely mean disaster for Ukrainian democracy. Also, a requirement on Ukraine’s domestic policy is technically a violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, affirmed in point 1.
All parties to the conflict will receive full amnesty for wartime actions and agree not to file claims or pursue grievances.
This would grant Russia immunity for the war crimes it has committed in Ukraine. The US may not have signed the Rome Statute to grant the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction in the US, but that should not be an excuse for the US to push the ICC to ignore Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Some argue that Putin committed up to 125,000 war crimes since invading Ukraine; ignoring Putin’s war crimes would create a slippery slope, where Russia’s evasion of international criminal action serves as a model for human rights violators across the world. With that said, this provision could be necessary for Putin to sign onto the deal, because if Putin feels he would be further pursued by the international community after the war ends, Putin would be less likely to end the war.
The agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Peace Council chaired by Donald J. Trump. Sanctions will apply to violators.
No mention of a Peace Council can be found in any of the points, so a lack of definition once again would reduce the intended impact this body is meant to have. In other words, both Ukraine and Russia are to write laws that restrict their own behavior, so making the agreement legally binding would simply be an echo of other points detailing the enforcement of territory and sovereignty. Russia already faces the threat of sanctions in earlier points if it fails to comply; a newly introduced prospect is a sanctions threat on Ukraine. Similar to how it is unlikely to lose security guarantees by sparking another war with Russia, Ukraine would not be willing to face the Russian repercussions of breaking the treaty in the first place, enshrining the sanctions as just an extra — and potentially unnecessary — deterrent.
After all sides agree, the ceasefire will take effect immediately once both sides withdraw to the agreed starting lines.
Many analysts predicted that a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine would not hold by itself, because more comprehensive territorial delineation and military enforcement mechanisms would be needed as well. The plan implements both a ceasefire and the extra, necessary measures simultaneously, making a ceasefire more likely to hold in the short-term, so peace can be ensured in the long-term.
Overall, Trump’s 28-point plan is ambitious and fairly detailed, but it favors Russia. Russia would appreciate realizing its gains in Ukraine, increasing economic integration, and getting away with wartime actions. The deal incorporated Russian input while lacking Ukrainian input, which likely contributed to the lopsided deal. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been contemplating the deal, not accepting or rejecting it in public. Historians will either compare the actions of the US to those of Neville Chamberlain’s, or will mark the 28-point deal as the first successful appeasement in history to date.
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