Syria's Civil War Isn't Over

After the Fall of Bashara Al-Assad, there has been hope in Syria that the new government of Ahmed Al-Sharaa can rebuild the nation. Pioneering polls from The Economist reflect this sentiment, with 81% of Syrians approving of Mr Sharaa’s rule. As the new order is safer, freer and less sectarian than Mr Assad’s regime, the Syrian population is ready for reconstruction and a new future. That is, only part of it. Fractured along sectarian ethnic lines, Al-Sharaa has promised to form an inclusive new government, inviting Western and Arab diplomatic delegations to help reconcile with disparate ethnic minorities. Specifically, ethno-cultural differences between Al-Sharaa’s Sunni people are in direct conflict with the minorities of the country, sparking fears that Syria’s Civil War isn’t over just yet. 

Flare-ups in Alawite Communities

In early March, Assad loyalist forces in his stronghold of Latakia ambushed security forces in Jableh. Further fighting in Idlib against Al-Sharaa’s security forces warranted a harsh, violating response. Over the course of 2 days, more than 1,000 people, including 745 civilians, were killed, making up one of the highest death tolls since 2011. The violence over the course of those 2 days didn’t just include fighting between the security forces of Al-Sharaa and Assad loyalists, but also the revenge killing of hundreds of ethnic Alawites by Sunni militias supported by Al-Sharaa. The events in Latakia and Idlib sparked massacres throughout the country, as Sunni militias killed Alawite civilians in Homs, Tartous, Hama and elsewhere. The prevention of this violence was attempted by Al-Sharaa, with his abolishment of “sharia patrols” alongside competent governance to keep the lights on, garbage collected and streets safe. Despite those efforts winning him friends beyond his Sunni base, the shift toward technocratic state-building didn’t have power-sharing in mind. Thus, the Alawites, the ethnic minority of the former Assad regime, were unconvinced by Al-Sharaa’s proclamations of inclusive governance, when they failed to see the new government represent them.

Rebel Militias in the North

In Syria’s north, not everyone is keen on joining Al-Sharaa’s security forces. Currently, militia groups that operate in Syria’s north, like the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or the Syrian National Army (SNA), haven’t been successfully integrated into Al-Sharaa’s government. Initially, Al-Sharaa attempted to integrate Syria’s armed factions into a single command, ending military factionalism. However, groups like the SNA have expressed concerns, such as Sharaa’s sole appeasement of larger factions in the SNA and ignorance toward tribal loyalties. Furthermore, groups like the SDF are most combative toward integrated governance. Despite initial attempts at negotiations, recent stalling due to the Kurdish wanting to “cultural and military sovereignty” has meant they’re butting headings with the Al-Sharaa government constantly. Seeking autonomy, these clashes have stalled hopes of military reunification by the Al-Sharaa government.

A Path Forward

Syria is a nation fractured along ethnic lines, so the fall of Assad was bound to leave many discontent. In his technocratic governance, Al-Sharaa has implanted his own people into roles such as prime ministers to traffic policemen and teachers. These “reforms” precipitated into a breakdown of trust between Al-Sharaa and Syria’ various militia and ethnic groups. Many refused to integrate into the new government’s security forces or practiced “reflagging.” As a result, the spike in violence in the Alawite community, the fallout of negotiations with the SNA/SDF, the formation of a military coalition by Druze militants in the south outside of Sharaa’s government, and the violent attacks by Islamic State (IS) cells, there is no easy path forward. In such an opaque environment, everyone is fearful of what tomorrow may bring. 

Extemp Analysis by Lindsey Zhao

Q: Will Al-Sharaa ever succeed in uniting Syria’s various militias?

I already know the sheer number of actors in Syria alone is enough to make me visibly sigh at the draw table if I ever drew this question :( but we push through anyway 🔥

As mentioned in “Ecuador Picks Noboa, Gonzalez Picks a Fight,” background will be really important here because of the complexity of the situation. Here are a few things I would try to mention in the BG

• BRIEF overview of coup (you honestly don’t have time for much else). I wouldn’t do something much longer than something like this: HTS, a militia group declared terrorists by the US, overthrew long standing dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, leading to widespread hope that Syria can finally begin to rebuild from a 14 year civil war. 

• Al-Sharaa’s rebuilding efforts + struggles with militias like Druze, IS, SDF, etc

  • Remember the question is talking about militias, not just minorities in general!

• What would “uniting” look like? Having interests equally shared in a representative government? 

In the SOS, describe the stakes if Al-Sharaa fails. Could another civil war erupt? How many lives hang in the balance?

This question is a “Will x do y” not “Can x do y”, so you need to analyze what is realistically possible, including the motivations and constraints facing Al-Sharaa.

IMO the answer is unfortunately no, because they have interests that are impossible to coordinate. In each point, since we’re saying no, we need to make sure to explain why these motivations aren’t likely to shift in the future (and thus, Al-Sharaa will never be successful.)

P1: Prosecuting war crimes

1. 1. Different militia groups have committed various war crimes in various regions, against various groups, over the years; they obviously don’t want to face charges for it

   2. No transitional justice council currently exists, and no one has a very strong incentive to create one if high-up figures in HTS, SNA, etc could be implicated in investigations. Yet, each group wants the others to be held accountable + this is a key demand of many civilians that militias represent

P2: Kurdish military sovereignty

1. SDF wants Kurdish self-rule, but the SNA and HTS favor a more centralized, nationalist approach

P3: Prioritization of tribal loyalty over merit

1. In the military, al-Sharaa currently favors a top-down approach, where he promotes those loyal to him rather than being purely merit based, promoting division

Read More Here:

• Dr. Rahaf Aldoughli, Chatham House

• Rob Geist Pinfold, War On The Rocks

• Hanna Davis, New Lines Magazine